Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) have received a great attention recently due to their potential and various applications. However, the initial phase of the VANET has many research challenges that need to be addressed, such as the issues of security and privacy protection caused by the openness of wireless communication networks among the city-wide applied regions. Specially, anomaly detection for a VANET has become a challenging problem, due to the changes in the scenario of VANETs comparing with traditional wireless networks. Motivated by this issue, we focus on the problem of anomaly detection in VANETs, and propose an effective anomaly detection approach based on the convolutional neural network in this paper. The proposed approach takes into account the spatio-temporal and sparse features of VANET traffic, and it uses a convolutional neural network architecture and a loss function based on Mahalanobis distance to extract and estimate the traffic matrix. Then, reinforcement learning is used to implement anomaly detection. Furthermore, a comprehensive assessment is provided to validate the proposed approach, which illustrates the effectiveness of this approach.
to build a safer intelligent transportation systems. Applying artificial intelligence to enhance the security of intelligent transportation systems has drawn more attention recently, with the rapid development of intelligent transportation systems [12] , [13] .
Traffic anomalies express the anomalous behaviors of network caused by various elements (e.g., malware and broken-down nodes in a network) [14] . Many approaches have been brought up to detect anomalies in traditional ISP networks over the last decade. Unfortunately, the problem of anomaly detection for VANETs is still a challenge, though the above state-of-the-art approaches have been directly applied to protect the security of VANETs. That is because the framework of a VANET is significantly different from the traditional ISP network, which can be summarized as follows:
• Fast Movement: In VANETs, the vehicles move at high speeds. As a result, the distance between two vehicles changes greatly.
• Topology variability: The users in VANETs access (or exit) the network frequently and randomly. Hence, the topology of a VANET changes frequently comparing with the traditional ISP network.
• Short-lived links: The fast movement and topology variability makes the links redirect continually. Moreover, the short-lived link is the major difference between VANETs and traditional ISP networks. The unique and ubiquitous characteristics of VANETs bring the main challenges in anomaly detection. Motivated by that, we propose a powerful anomaly detection method in which the spatio-temporal and sparse features of network traffic are considered as additional information to improve the false negative alarm of intrusion detection systems. In details, see Fig. 1 , we first analyze the features of traffic flows of VANETs in various dimensions. After that, convolutional neural network (CNN) techniques are used to estimate network traffic. Besides, using the sparse feature of traffic matrix, a loss function based on Mahalanobis distance is adopted to reduce the estimation error of the proposed approach. Finally, an identifying approach is put forward to handle the issue of anomaly detection according to the estimates of network traffic. Our work contains the following main contributions:
• We design a CNN architecture to capture the spatio-temporal and sparse characteristics of network traffic in VANETs.
• Using the sparse feature of the traffic matrix, we propose a loss function based on the Mahalanobis distance to reduce the estimation error.
• Based on the traffic matrix estimation, we put forward to a reinforcement learning approach to identify anomalous elements in traffic flows. The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section II, we outline the current anomaly detection methods. Then in Section III, the background about the problem investigated in this paper is introduced such as the network traffic datasets, convolutional neural network techniques and reinforcement learning. In Section IV, the approach put forward to in this paper is introduced. Furthermore, in Section V, we provide numerical experiments using real network traffic from our testbed to assess the proposed approach. Finally, we summarize our research in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
For the conventional ISP networks, lots of anomaly detection approaches have been put forward, and the related techniques are quite mature. Most of these methods attempt to select an appropriate model to express the features of traffic flows firstly [15] - [18] . By utilizing statistical modeling to some sort of network traffic data as a priority, the problem of anomaly detection can be regarded as a hypothesis testing. In this case, some statistical decision methods have been proposed to handle the problem of hypothesis testing. For instance, Nevat et al. formulated the problem of anomaly detection by the Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) [19] . The authors proposed two efficient algorithms with low-complexity to detect anomalous traffic as well as attributes of anomalies in flows, in which the cross entropy method and the GLRT were used respectively. Subspace-based methods are widely used in traditional large-scale ISP networks for anomaly detection. Typically, the principal component analysis (PCA) first used the aggregation flows to calculate the normal and anomalous subspaces by way of a threshold-based approach. Then, the observed traffic data were projected onto two subspaces to make a decision for anomaly detection. So far, many subspace-based approaches have been presented in the literature so as to improve the PCA method. For instance, the authors in [20] proposed a distance-based subspace method to implement dimensionality reducing, and then projected the observed traffic data onto the anomalous subspace for anomaly detection. Besides, aiming at online anomaly detection in realtime, the authors put forward a decentralized subspace-based method, which can reduce the computation complexity of anomaly detection remarkably.
The simple machine learning methods are subject to many limitations [21] , and intrusions become more complex and diverse with time going on. We need more effective learning methods, especially in the automatic extraction of intrusive features, extraction of normal network characteristics and analysis of intrusions. Naseer et al. developed anomaly detection models based on deep neural network architecture with different depths, including convolutional neural network, automatic encoder and recursive neural networks [22] . The authors present experimental results of a deep intrusion detection system model, which shows that we can well use deep learning in anomaly detection systems. Shone et al. presented a new model by using deep learning that could perform network anomaly detection in modern networks [23] . Their proposed model is combined with deep learning and shallow learning and can correctly analyze a wide range of network traffic. They proposed a new approach for unsupervised feature learning, this approach is Non-symmetric Deep Auto-Encoder, which provides asymmetric data dimension reduction unlike typical auto-encoder methods. Thus, their technique can improve classification results compared with many other major approaches.
Deep neural network is the most successful representation learning technology and has made remarkable achievements in many scenes [24] . And deep neural networks are more efficient to solve the problems in anomaly detection. There is more efficiency and lower error in model building and analysis. Convolutional neural network and recurrent neural network (RNN) are the two most widely used deep neural network approaches. They can learn effectively spatial and temporal characteristics, respectively. Wang et al. proposed a hierarchical spatial-temporal features-based anomaly detection method which can learn network traffic features automatically [25] . The system combines CNN and RNN methods to detect anomaly network. The basic construction is using CNN to learn the internal spatial features, and RNN to learn the temporal features of network. Moreover, the estimated traffic features are used to detect anomaly network intrusion. The whole feature learning process is automatically completed by the deep neural network. And the flow function of automatic learning can effectively reduce the false alarm rate.
As mentioned above, although many state-of-the-art anomaly detection approaches have been put forward in traditional ISP networks, all of them are not suitable for VANETs due to the particular scenario of VANETs. Hence, some methods aiming at detecting anomalous traffic of VANETs are proposed. So as to study the best solution of the anomaly detection of vehicular networks, Wu et al. put forward a new information entropy based approach [26] . The basic design concept is using a fixed number of messages as sliding windows. And by using a simulated annealing algorithm to improve the strategy and optimize the decision conditions of the sliding window. The method can improve the anomaly detection accuracy and reduce the false positive rate. This method can effectively increase the security of the in-vehicle network environment. In [6] , the authors proposed an approach for detecting jamming attacks by extracting the spatial features of jammers and moving station of vehicles. The authors in [27] proposed a detection approach for jamming attacks utilizing Boxplot rule and compressive sensing in wideband cognitive radio. With the development of VANETs, the services provided by a VANET are much more manifold than before.Thereby, network traffic includes multiple dimensions, that is, it can be viewed as the superposition of statistical features. As a result, a simple model has never been well enough for accurately identifying current attacks.
III. PRELIMINARY A. TRAFFIC FLOWS AND TRAFFIC MATRIX
End-to-End network traffic, known as origin-destination (OD) flows, describes the volume of traffic from origin node to destination node [28] - [30] . For all possible OD pairs in a network with √ N nodes, we can denote them by the traffic matrix. In this paper, we denote a traffic matrix and its element by X and x n,t (n = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N and t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , T ), respectively. T is the length of the traffic reported by the traffic matrix X. Each row vector of the traffic matrix is a time series that refers to an OD flow. According to the given network management operation, it needs a specific traffic matrix with various time scales and granularities. Generally, the time scale is 10-min or 15-min, namely, x n,t expresses the means of units over a time slot. In this paper, the granularity of traffic is the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) packet, which means that x n,t denotes the means of TCP packets at time slot t.
B. CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORKS
The CNN is a prevalent deep learning technique in image processing and pattern recognition [31] - [33] . In addition, it is good at mining local features of data and extracting global training features. The most important point is that the CNN can perform feature extraction through fast training and has high accuracy. Besides, the CNN is an available methodology to capture the spatio-temporal feature of 2-dimensional datasets by using convolutional kernels. In the convolutional layer, after defining the spatial locations (i, j) with respect to the input maps for all neurons, the output maps can be computed by combining convolutions with multiple input maps [1] , [32] . That can be described as follows:
where k (l) denotes kernels with learned weights in the l-th convolutional layer, and b (l) denotes the bias. The notation f (·) represents the activation function which is usually defined as sigmoids and rectified linear units (ReLUs) and so on.
The gradient back-propagation algorithm is able to compute the parameters of a CNN effectively. Thereby, we utilize the CNN-based approach to handle the problem of anomaly detection.
C. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is an important branch of machine learning [34] - [36] . It is based on the environment, and maximize the expected reward through continuous learning. Based on this characteristic, we optimize the threshold by reinforcement learning, and use the optimized threshold to identify anomalous elements in traffic flows. Reinforcement learning uses the method of acquiring the sample while learning. After acquiring the sample, the model will be updated, and then the current model is used to guide the next action. Then, through the next action, the reward is obtained. Furthermore, the model will be updated according to the reward. The above iteration is repeated until the model converges. During this process, when the current model is available, it is very crucial to select the next action. The selected action must be the most beneficial one to improve the current model, which involves two crucial concepts in RL, i.e., exploration and exploitation. The exploration refers to gather much more information, which means to select the action among all actions, and the chances of choosing each action are the same. By contrast, exploitation refers to make the best action based on current information, which means to select the action that has been executed, and the action must have the highest average reward value.
The decision in RL is implemented by using an agent. The agent can receive an observation of the current environment. Meanwhile, it can also receive a reward after performing an action. The environment is the object of the agent interaction. It is an object whose behavior is uncontrollable. The agent does not know how the environment reacts to different actions at first, and the environment will tell the agent the current environment state through the observation. At the same time, the environment can give a feedback to the agent according to the possible final result, which indicates how good or how bad the decision is made by the agent. The goal of the entire reinforcement learning optimization is to maximize the cumulative reward. The reinforcement learning model framework is shown in Fig. 2 . The ε-greedy algorithm is a method of reinforcement learning [34] - [36] . The ε-greedy algorithm is based on a probability of compromise exploration and exploitation. Specifically, during each attempt, the exploration is conducted on the probability of ε, that is, an action is randomly selected according to the uniform probability. The ε-greedy algorithm only needs to record the current average reward value of each action and the number of times selected, and they can be updated incrementally.
The ε-greedy algorithm can be denoted by A, K , P, V , where A and K are the sets of states and actions of an agent, respectively. The matrix P is made up of the probability of action k. V is the reward function, that is, after the action k, the environment will give the reward according to the policy. Let Q(k) record the average reward for action k. If the action k is tried n times, the reward is v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n , then the average reward is:
If the average reward is calculated directly from the Eq. 2, n rewards have to be recorded. Obviously, it is more efficient to perform an incremental calculation of the mean, that is, to update Q(k) immediately after each attempt. It is possible to use the subscript to indicate the number of attempts. Initially, Q 0 (k) = 0. For any n ≥ 1, if the average reward after the n − 1 times attempt is Q n−1 (k), then after the n times attempt to win the reward v n , the average reward should be updated to:
This enables us to obtain accumulate rewards.
IV. ANOMALY DETECTION METHOD
Our anomaly detection approach consists of two phases. First, a deep learning architecture based on CNN is designed for network traffic estimation. Corresponding to the traffic matrix estimates, a decision approach is utilized to identify the normal and anomalous traffic entries.
A. TRAFFIC MATRIX ESTIMATION BASED ON SPATIO-TEMPORAL AND SPARSE FEATURES
As mentioned above, the traffic matrix has a variety of statistical characteristics including spatial, temporal, and spatiotemporal. Besides, since the users in VANETs access the network arbitrarily, the traffic flows in VANETs have much more irregular fluctuations than that of the traditional ISP network. That is expressed by a traffic matrix with sparsity.
In this case, we are capable of taking advantage of this feature to improve the accuracy of traffic matrix estimation.
1) SPATIO-TEMPORAL EXTRACTION BASE ON CNN ARCHITECTURE
Lots of researches such as multifractal, short-range dependence, long-range dependence, heavy-tailed distribution, and power laws have proved that the traffic matrix obeys a series of spatial and temporal features. It is significantly crucial in traffic matrix estimation to use these features as a prior information for improving the availability of traffic matrix estimation. Moreover, in spatio-temporal feature, an element of a traffic matrix is close to its neighbour in value. This has been used in traffic matrix estimation. Therefore, we use a CNN architecture for purpose of pursue the spatio-temporal feature of traffic matrix for estimation. The design of CNN architecture should consider the features of a traffic matrix. In the previous work, based on the spatio-temporal feature of traffic matrix, we have designed a CNN architecture in [1] . Thereby, we continue to employ this CNN architecture in this paper. The CNN architecture proposed in [1] is plotted in Fig. 3 . This architecture has 4 convolutional layers to track the spatio-temporal features of input datasets. Furthermore, 4 sub-sampling layers with a factor of 2 are utilized in the proposed approach. The first convolutional layer contains 6 convolution kernels with 7 × 7 spatial dimensions. Furthermore, the following two convolutional layers also consist of 6 convolution kernels, but they are 6 × 6 and 5 × 5 in spatial dimension, respectively. The 4-th convolutional layer is made up of 12 convolution kernels whose spatial dimensions are 5 × 5. Before the output layer including N elements, there is a fully connected layer that is designed for transforming the extracted features into the output layer.
We define the input data as a square matrix, whose elements can be denoted by x n,t where n, t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N . In the l-th convolutional layer, the notation k (l,m) j is defined as the j-th element of the m-th kernel, where j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N (l) and m = 1, 2, 3, . . . , M (l) . The notations N (l) and M (l) denote the number of elements and kernels of the l-th layer. In this paper, for the l-th convolutional layer, we take the inputs by a vector a
The traffic flows in VANETs are full of irregular fluctuations, namely, the deep learning architecture should be sensitive for large traffic in order to implement traffic matrix estimation. Based on this situation, the ReLU is selected as an activation function in our CNN architecture. At this moment, the output map is given below:
where the superscript (l, m) is the index of the convolutional layer and the corresponding kernel, respectively. The notation ReLU (·) represents an operation called the ReLU function. The notation k (l,m) is the vectorial representation of kernels k
, . . . , k (l,m) N (l) . All the sub-sampling layers perform the average pooling operation.
2) SPARSITY LOSS FUNCTION
For all input traffic matrices X (m) , we have h k,b X (m) at the output layer where m is the index of training examples. The output of the proposed CNN architecture h k,b X (m) is an N × 1 vector. The proposed sparsity loss function includes two terms, which are the Mahalanobis distance term and the sparsity term. They can be denoted by:
where λ is an extra term. Then, given a training example X (m) , x (m) N +1 , the Mahalanobis distance term is defined as:
The matrix P is the covariance matrix with respect to h k,b X (m) and x (m) N +1 . Figure 4 shows two OD flows collected from our testbed (in Section V will introduce in detail). In this figure, the x-axis shows the time slot, and the y-axis shows the number of packets transmitted in VANETs. We find that these OD flows contains a lot of fluctuations. Obviously, considering all of OD flows at a time slot (namely a column vector of the traffic matrix), the trace is also rugged. As a result, the Euclidean distance is not suitable as a metric at all. Figure 5 indicates the motivation of using the Mahalanobis distance instead of the Euclidean distance for traffic estimation. In this figure, there are three vectors indexed by #1, #2, and #3 in the three-dimensional space whose coordinates are (x 1 , y 1 , z 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 , z 2 ), and (x 3 , y 3 , z 3 ), and x 1 = x 2 = x 3 , y 1 = y 2 . According to the definition of the Euclidean distance, the distance D (1, 2) between #1 and #2 is |z 1 − z 2 |, and D (1, 3) = (x 1 − x 3 ) 2 + (z 1 − z 3 ) 2 between #1 and #3. In Fig. 5 , we find that the D (1, 2) > D (1, 3) obviously. We assume that #1 is a real traffic flow, and #2 and #3 are its estimates. In fact, the problem of traffic flow estimation prefers to estimate the outline of a traffic flow rather than estimate each element of this traffic flow absolutely. Therefore, from Fig. 6 , comparing with #3, #2 is able to pursue the outline of #1 much more approximately. Based on this analysis, the Mahalanobis distance is utilized as the metric in our method. The sparsity term is denoted as follows for a given training example:
where the notation · 1 is the 1 -norm that can extract the sparsity of traffic flows. Furthermore, given M training cases X (1) , x (1) N +1 , X (2) , x (2) N +1 , . . . , X (M ) , x (M ) N +1 , the loss function of our method can be formulated as:
We use the 1 -norm to capture the sparsity of traffic matrices, which takes into account a fact that a sparse vector is aligned with the coordinate axes with a high possibility. Nevertheless, a traffic matrix with the heavy-tailed distribution is not sparse absolutely. Hence, we project the traffic data onto a transform domain so that it can be described by a sparse matrix. The universal approach to explore the sparsity of traffic matrices is the PCA method by way of the singular value decomposition [28] . Hence, for the sparsity term, we take advantage of the PCA method to approximate a traffic matrix so that it is sparse absolutely. At this time, a prior information of traffic matrix is needed to construct the sparse representation of traffic matrix, which can be shown by:
By the singular value decomposition to the prior of the traffic matrix X, we can obtain an eigenflow matrix, a diagonal matrix and an orthogonal matrix (denoted by U, and V , respectively). The eigenflow matrix, which presents the time-varying characteristics of a traffic matrix, is made up of the eigenflow derived from the singular value decomposition of the traffic matrix. The diagonal matrix consists of the singular values of the traffic matrix X. From Eqs. 8 and 10, the sparsity term can be deduced as:
3) TRAINING
In our method, the gradient back-propagation method is adopted to calculate the optimal parameters of the proposed deep architecture. The parameters of the CNN architecture are computed according to the gradient descent of the loss function L, namely:
Meanwhile, all parameters are updated according to the learning rate α, which is shown as follows:
In the gradient back-propagation method, the gradients of the loss function L is calculated via the error term shown as follows:
where i is the index of the output units, and P −1 i denotes the i-th row vector of the matrix P −1 . Then, we can obtain the gradients of the loss function L via the backpropagation approach.
B. ANOMALY DETECTION BASED ON REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
After achieving the estimator of the network traffic, we propose a threshold-based anomaly detection mechanism according to the estimation error of the CNN-based deep architecture. That can be described as follows:
where error(X,X) = X −X is estimation error, the matrices X andX are real network traffic and its estimator. The threshold is computed by learning the prior of estimation error via the ε-greedy algorithm. At first, we define the value of probability ε. Besides, we also define a set denoted by K , and its elements can be denoted by k i where i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and k N is the maximum threshold. The matrix Q(k i ), where i = 1, 2, . . . , N , records the average reward of each threshold. We define a set denoted by G(k i ) records the reward with respect to the threshold k i , which can be shown by:
and we calculate G(k i ) according to the following indicators [37] :
• TP -The error data is properly classified as an error.
• FP -The correct data is falsely classified as an error.
• TN -The correct data is properly classified as correct.
• FN -The error data is falsely classified as correct. We define count(k i ) as the number of iterations of each threshold. The proposed anomaly detection based on reinforcement learning is shown by Algorithm 1. In our algorithm, we first randomly select an action with a uniform probability, that is generating a number from 0 to 1 randomly and comparing it with ε. If the generated variable is less than ε, the threshold is randomly generated from the set K, otherwise we choose the threshold with the largest cumulative reward. Then, the selected threshold is employed to anomaly detection, and the anomalous traffic determined by the threshold is compared with the actual anomalous traffic to obtain G(k i ) of the selected threshold. The average reward of each threshold is incrementally updated, and is completed by the following formula:
and the number of iterations of the threshold is recorded by the following formula:
In this paper, we collect a traffic dataset with 5000 time slots. We will set the threshold from the 2000-th time slot. Starting from the 2000-th time slot, we calculate the optimal threshold based on the attack situation of 2000 time periods before each time slot, and set this threshold as the current time slot threshold.
V. EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate our approach based on the simulations for a real traffic dataset via our testbed. The testbed contains a RSU and 12 nodes. Meanwhile, the services provided by the testbed Algorithm 1 Anomaly Detection Algorithm Based on Reinforcement Learning Input: probability ε; the set K ; number of iterations T ; a prior of the real network traffic X; relative estimator X Initialize:
average reward matrix Q(k i ) where i = 1, 2, . . . , N ; counting set count(k i ) where i = 1, 2, . . . , N ; reward set G(k i ) where i = 1, 2, . . . , N 1: m ← 1 2: error(X,X) = X −X 3: a is randomly generated between 0 and 1 4: while m ≤ T do 5: if a < ε then 6: Randomly select the threshold k i from the threshold matrix The selected threshold k i is used for anomaly detec- 14: m ← m + 1 15: end while 16: Output: Q(k i ) 17: Choose the threshold with the largest cumulative performance value in Q(k i ), and the threshold is used for anomaly detection consist of video, radio and so on. The Low Orbit Ion Cannon is used to implement DDoS attacks in our simulations. All traffic flows are collected by the Wireshark that is an open source packet analyzer. In order to simulate the environment of a VANET, we assume that the distance of a pair of nodes is an independent and identically distributed variable that obeys a Gaussian (Normal) distribution with expectation and variance of 10 and 5, respectively. Simultaneously, the topology of our network is built by the Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) algorithm. The general urban path loss model [38] is used to define the weights of the OSPF algorithm, which is shown as follows:
where d i,j is the distance between the nodes i and j. The notation d 0 is defined as the close-in reference distance, and d 0 >> λ 2π . Here, β is the received power decays with distance, and the rate of β is 10βdB decade. The notation n denotes the path loss exponent, and the notation α refers to attenuation constant. The notation f FAF denotes the floor attenuation factor. The PCA approach is contained in our simulations for comparison, and we will assess the capability of two algorithms in traffic estimation and anomaly detection scenarios.
A. TRAFFIC MATRIX ESTIMATION
We first evaluate the performance of our approach so-called CNN based on Mahalanobis Distance and Sparsity (CNN-MDS) in network traffic estimation, and directly compare actual network traffic with homologous estimators. Figure 7 shows two OD flows selected optionally from our testbed. The x-axis refers to the time slot, and the y-axis denotes the volume of traffic flow. From these figures, the CNN-MDS approach can accurately track the traces of OD flows, although these OD flows consist of many steep fluctuations. After comparing the actual network traffic with their estimators, we use the spatial relative errors (SREs) and temporal relative errors (TREs) to evaluate the performance of our method, which are defined as follows:
where x n,t andx n,t are real traffic element and its estimator, respectively. The notation · 2 denotes the 2 -norm. Figure 8 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of SRE and TRE for two approaches. We see that CNNMDS obtains a significant improvement compared with PCA method in TRE. However, the improvement in SRE is not remarkable enough. CNNMDS has better performance than PCA through multiple measurements. For the purpose of providing a precise estimator which is close to the real value, we verify the estimation bias and standard deviation, and we define them as: where SD(n) is named sample standard deviation. Figure 9 shows the deviation of PCA and our method. The x-axis denotes the identities of traffic flows sorted according to the averages of each flow, and the y-axis indicates the bias. In the figure, the PCA method is more or less biased against lightweight and elephant flows. Figure 10 shows that the variance of CNNMDS is lower than PCA, which means that CNNMDS tends to estimate short timescale variations exactly. This paper uses relative root mean square error (RRMSE) as one of the main evaluation indicators of algorithm estimation accuracy, which is defined as:
where x n,t andx n,t are real traffic element and its estimator, respectively. Figure 11 shows the RRMSEs of two methods. The x-axis denotes the time slot, and the y-axis indicates the RRMSE. The average value of RRMSE of the PCA method was 12.15%, and that is 4.89% for CNNMDS, which means that CNNMDS has better performance than PCA. Figure 13 shows the cumulative distribution function of RRMSE. The x-axis denotes the RRMSE, and the y-axis indicates the cumulative distribution function of RRMSE. Figure 12 declares that about 90% of the moments, the RRM-SEs of two methods (our method and PCA) are less than 8.25% and 24.24% in turn. Through Figure 11 and Figure 12 , We see that the CNNMDS has better performance than PCA.
B. ANOMALY DETECTION
We use the Eq. 16 to evaluate the accuracy of the reinforcement learning-based anomaly detection. The accuracy refers to the proportion of the number of properly predicted samples to the total number of predicted samples. We also use the following measures to evaluate the performance of reinforcement learning-based anomaly detection [37] :
The precision refers to the number of proper classifications.
The recall is used to measure the number of proper classifications, and the recall will be penalized based on the number of missed entries.
The false alarm refers to the rate of proper samples falsely classified as wrong samples.
F_Measures = 2 ·
Pr ecision · Recall Pr ecision + Recall .
The F_Measures refers to the harmonic mean of recall and precision.
We collect a traffic dataset with 5000 time slots from our testbad for evaluation. The first dataset with 2000 time slots is viewed as the training dataset, and the testing dataset has 3000 time slots. Figure 13-15 show the performance of the reinforcement learning method under 4 OD flows via the testing dataset with different anomalies. The anomalies attacks are randomly generated in the 4 OD flows, and each attack continues for 60 time slots. From these simulation results, we see that the reinforcement learning method can obtain a desired accuracy for anomaly detection.
Finally, we validate the robustness of our approach by carrying out stringent tests under different scenarios. For each scenario, we define a factor of anomalies with respect to normal traffic, that is: where x 0 and x attacks are normal and abnormal traffic. x mix is the real traffic with anomalies. The notationsx 0 andx attacks are the averages of the two traffic types. We use the true positive rate as a metric to compare the reinforcement learning method with the CNNMDS method and the PCA method. The CNNMDS method just estimates the network traffic by CNNMDS and implements anomaly detection using the 3σ method. Figure 16 displays the true positive rates (TPRs) with respect to different factors. We see that CNNMDS and RL is outstanding compared to the PCA method in TPR. Meanwhile, the RL method prefers to detect a large anomaly rather than a small one.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the issue of anomaly detection in VANETs.
Compared with the conventional ISP network, the statistical characteristic of network traffic in VANETs is much more irregular, which brings in a series of issues in anomaly detection. Motivated by that, we propose a CNN-based anomaly detection method. The proposed method consists of two phases: a traffic matrix estimation phase and a threshold-based anomalous detection phase. The CNN is adapted to pursue the spatio-temporal feature of network traffic in VANETs. Moreover, using the sparse feature of traffic matrix, a loss function based on Mahalanobis distance is adapted to reduce the estimation error of the proposed approach. According to the estimates of traffic flows, we use a reinforcement learning-based approach to identify anomalous elements in traffic flows. Using the actual network traffic dataset from our testbed consisting of a RSU and 12 OBUs, We also supply some experiments to assess the performance of the our approach in traffic matrix estimation and anomaly detection. On the basis of the simulation results, the our method can improve the TPR obviously.
